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Abstract  
On many occasions, people spontaneously or deliberately take the perspective of a person facing them rather than their own 
perspective. How is this done? Using a spatial perspective task in which participants were asked to identify objects at specific 
locations, we found that self-perspective judgments were faster for objects presented to the right, rather than the left, and for 
objects presented closer to the participants’ own bodies. Strikingly, taking the opposing perspective of another person led to a 
reversal (i.e., remapping) of these effects, with reference to the other person’s position (Experiment 1). A remapping of spatial 
relations was also observed when an empty chair replaced the other person (Experiment 2), but not when access to the other 
viewpoint was blocked (Experiment 3). Thus, when the spatial scene allows a physically feasible but opposing point of view, 
people respond as if their own bodies were in that place. Imagination can thus overcome perception. 
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How do people represent the location of things in space? In 
contrast to the uniform extension of Newtonian space, a 
space delineated by experiential relations is used in everyday 
life: Things appear “either nearer or farther, above or below, 
right or left” (Husserl, 1952/1989, p. 158). A person who is 
alone computes these relations with reference to his or her 
own position in space, that is, using an egocentric frame of 
reference. For example, someone sitting alone at a table 
might say that a cup on the opposite side is “far from me, 
from my body” (Husserl, 1952/1989, p. 166). In richer 
physical and social environments, however, other people 
often feature prominently, and a person may spontaneously 
refer spa-tial relations to another person’s perspective. 
When peo-ple are asked to tell someone else where 
something is located, for example, they typically answer 
from the other person’s viewpoint (e.g., “on your left”; 
Mainwaring, Tversky, Ohgishi, & Schiano, 2003; Schober, 
1993). More-over, even when not communicating, observers 
may 
 
 
spontaneously describe spatial relations from the oppos-ing 
spatial perspective of another person (Tversky & Hard, 
2009), a tendency that strengthens when that other person’s 
intention is ambiguous (Furlanetto, Cavallo, Manera, 
Tversky, & Becchio, 2013). Thus, when an observer is 
facing another person, “near” can become near to that other 
person but far from the observer, and “to the right” can refer 
to that other person’s right but to the observer’s left. How 
can people take the conflicting spatial perspective of another 
person facing them rather than their own very real 
perspective?
1 
 
One possibility is that people do not set aside their own 
spatial perspective when adopting another person’s but 
instead use it as a starting point to recompute the 
 
 
  
relations of the objects from that other perspective 
(recomputing hypothesis). That is, people could initially 
compute the spatial relations from their own perspective and 
only subsequently adjust (i.e., recompute) those relations to 
accommodate differences between their own and the other 
perspective, for example, by reversing left and right (Epley, 
Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Shelton & 
McNamara, 1997, 2001).  
Another hypothesis is that people take the perspective of 
an opposing person by remapping the locations of the 
objects to an altercentric frame of reference, that is, by 
mentally placing themselves in the other person’s posi-tion 
(remapping hypothesis). Although remapping might seem 
surprising, indirect evidence for it comes from patients who 
exhibit unilateral spatial neglect. Neglect patients typically 
ignore objects on their left when asked to respond from their 
own perspective. Recently, how-ever, it has been 
demonstrated that they are able to recover previously 
omitted items when responding from the perspective of a 
person seated opposite them (Becchio, Del Giudice, Dal 
Monte, Latini-Corazzini, & Pia, 2013). Thus, it seems that 
they might update (i.e., remap) object locations to an intact 
altercentric frame of reference. Whether remapping also 
supports spatial per-spective taking in typical brains, 
however, is yet to be determined. Could people remap 
spatial relations to another perspective rather than recompute 
them?  
This is the first question we addressed in the present 
study. In a simple task, we asked participants to report the 
left/right spatial location of a target (an apple) from their 
own perspective and from the perspective of a human avatar 
facing them. The apple was either close to the participants 
but far from the avatar or close to the avatar but far from the 
participants. Prior research sug-gests that with an egocentric 
frame of reference, relative times to identify objects at 
specific locations depend on body asymmetries, asymmetries 
in the world, and action possibilities (Franklin & Tversky, 
1990). Right-handers, for instance, are faster to process 
objects on the right than objects on the left (Furlanetto, 
Gallace, Ansuini, & Becchio, 2014; Olson & Laxar, 1973). 
Moreover, reaction times (RTs) are generally proportional to 
the distance of the target, increasing as distance of the to-be-
located objects increases (Sun & Wang, 2010). We took 
advan-tage of these effects to investigate how spatial 
relations are mapped from self- and other-perspectives. We 
rea-soned that if participants recomputed spatial relations, 
then regardless of the perspective they were asked to take, 
they would respond faster when the apple was to their right 
and closer to them. Alternatively, if participants remapped 
the spatial relations by mentally envisioning the scene from 
the avatar’s perspective, their judgments would be faster on 
self-perspective trials when the apple was to the right (rather 
than to the left) and closer to the 
 
participant but faster on other-perspective trials when the 
apple was to the right and closer to the avatar.  
We tested these predictions in Experiment 1. After 
finding evidence for remapping from the perspective of a 
human avatar sitting at the opposite end of a table, we 
conducted two further experiments that were attempts to 
break the remapping, that is, to find its limits. In Experi-
ment 2, we replaced the human avatar with an empty chair. 
In Experiment 3, we positioned the table against the wall 
and placed two bookcases at the sides of the table, to 
discourage access to the opposite perspective. 
 
Experiment 1 
 
On each trial of Experiment 1, participants viewed a scene 
such as the one depicted in Figure 1. They were asked to 
judge whether the apple was to the left or right from their 
own perspective and from that of the human avatar seated at 
the opposite end of the table. RTs served as a proxy for how 
difficult self-perspective and other-perspective judgments 
were. 
 
Method 
 
Participants.  We based our sample size on previously 
published studies testing spatial perspective taking (Kessler 
& Thomson, 2010). Prior to data collection, we decided to 
test 27 participants. All 27 (13 women, 14 men; mean age = 
23.8 years, range = 19–36) were healthy and right-handed, 
had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, and were 
naive to the purpose of the experiment. None had a history 
of neurological, major medical, or psychiatric disorders. The 
experimental procedures were approved by the ethics 
committee of the University of Turin and were carried out in 
accordance with the prin-ciples of the revised Helsinki 
Declaration (World Medi-cal Association, 2013). Written 
informed consent was obtained from each participant prior 
to the experiment. 
 
Stimuli.  The experimental stimuli consisted of pictures 
showing a 2-D room that contained a rectangular table with 
an apple on it. The field of view of the virtual cam-era was 
set to match the field of view of a person seated at one end 
of the table. In all stimuli, a male human ava-tar was seated 
at the opposite end of the table, with hands resting on the 
table. The apple was presented in one of four positions: The 
right-near position was on the right side of the table close to 
the participant, near enough to be virtually reachable for him 
or her (Fig. 1a); the right-far position was on the right side 
of the table far from the participant, in close proximity to the 
avatar, so as to be virtually reachable by the avatar (Fig. 1b); 
the left-near position was on the left side of the table close to 
the participant (Fig. 1c); and the left-far position was on 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Experimental stimuli for Experiment 1. The stimuli were pictures showing a virtual room that contained a rectangular table with an apple on it. A 
male human avatar was seated at one end of the table, opposite the participant. The apple could be in any one of four positions: (a) right-near, (b) right-far, 
(c) left-near, or (d) left-far. Participants were asked to report verbally whether the apple was on the “left” or “right” from either their own or the avatar’s 
perspective. 
 
the left side of the table far from the participant (Fig. 1d). 
The room, the human avatar, and the apple were created with 
the 3-D animation software Poser 9 (SmithMicro Software, 
Aliso Viejo, CA). 
 
Procedure.  Participants were seated in a comfortable chair 
in front of a 17-in. computer screen, at a viewing distance of 
50 cm. They were asked to keep their arms uncrossed for the 
entire duration of the experiment (see Furlanetto et al., 
2014). Each trial began with a green fixation cross presented 
on a black background for 500 ms. The word “You” or 
“Avatar” then appeared for 1,000 ms, instructing participants 
to take, respectively, either their own perspective (self-
perspective trials) or the avatar’s perspective (other-
perspective trials). Then the picture of the virtual room 
appeared and remained on-screen until a response was given 
or 3,000 ms had elapsed. Participants were instructed to 
report verbally whether the apple was on the “left” or “right” 
from the given perspective. The participants’ vocal RTs 
were recorded. In addition, their responses were recorded 
manually by the experimenter using a wireless keyboard. 
 
Participants completed 120 trials (60 self-perspective and 60 
other-perspective trials) divided into four blocks. The order 
of self- and other-perspective trials was pseudoran-domized 
to ensure that participants were not asked to answer from the 
same perspective more than three times in a row. The 
experiment took approximately 30 min. The timing and 
ordering of the trials, as well as the col-lection of vocal RTs, 
were controlled by E-Prime software (Version 2.0; 
Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2012). 
 
Data analysis.  Trials in which vocal RTs deviated more 
than 2 SD from the mean of the corresponding experi-mental 
condition were discarded as outliers (4.30%), as were trials 
in which participants responded incorrectly (7.83%). In 
addition, 2 participants were excluded from the group 
analysis because their RTs deviated more than 2 SD from 
the group average. Vocal RTs were submitted to a 2 × 4 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
perspective (self, other) and position (right-near, right-far, 
left-near, left-far) as within-subjects factors. A significance 
threshold of p < .05 was set for all statistical tests, and 
Holm-Sidak correction was applied
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Fig. 2.  Results from Experiment 1: mean vocal reaction time (RT) on self- and other-perspective trials as a function of left/right position of the 
apple (left graph) and near/far position of the apple (right graph). For both perspectives, apple positions are reported from the participants’ 
perspective. Error bars represent ±1 SE. 
 
for pairwise comparisons. For the sake of clarity, the lev-els 
of the position variable are defined here with respect to the 
participant’s perspective, regardless of the perspec-tive the 
participant was asked to take (self, other). 
 
Results 
 
As found in previous work (Furlanetto et al., 2014), par-
ticipants were more accurate when they responded from their 
own perspective (M = .945, 95% confidence interval, or CI = 
[.929, .961]) than when they responded from the avatar’s 
perspective (M = .895, 95% CI = [.866,  
.925]), t(24) = 3.58, p = .002. The 2 × 4 ANOVA on vocal 
RTs yielded a significant main effect of perspective, F(1, 24) 
= 46.18, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .658; RTs were slower on other-
perspective trials (M = 791.24 ms, 95% CI = [703.31, 
879.17]) than on self-perspective trials (M = 676.15 ms, 95% 
CI = [612.41, 739.88]). There was also a main effect of 
position, F(1, 24) = 3.42, p = .022, ηp
2
 = .125. These effects 
were moderated by a significant interaction between 
perspective and position, F(3, 72) = 19.108, p <  
.001, ηp
2
 = .443. On self-perspective trials, there was a 
significant advantage when the apple was positioned on the 
right side (right-near and right-far: M = 627.74 ms, 95% CI 
= [568.21, 687.27]) rather than on the left side (left-near and 
left-far: M = 724.55 ms, 95% CI = [653.02, 796.09]), F(1, 
24) = 37.12, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .607 (Fig. 2, left graph), and 
also when it was near (right-near and left-near: M = 650.29 
ms, 95% CI = [591.20, 709.39]) rather than far (right-far and 
left-far: M = 701.99 ms, 95% CI = [631.43, 772.56]), F(1, 
24) = 16.39, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .406 (Fig. 2, right graph). 
Crucially, and in line with the 
 
remapping hypothesis, these mappings were reversed when 
participants responded from the perspective of the human 
avatar. On other-perspective trials, RTs were significantly 
faster when the apple appeared on the left side (left-near and 
left-far: M = 756.09 ms, 95% CI = [686.45, 843.75]) rather 
than on the right side (right-near and right-far: M = 817.39 
ms, 95% CI = [717.06, 917.72]), F(1, 24) = 7.38, p = .012, 
ηp
2
 = .235 (Fig. 2, left graph), and when it was far (right-far 
and left-far: M = 778.05 ms, 95% CI = [693.21, 862.89]) 
rather than near (right-near and left-near: M = 804.43 ms, 
95% CI = [712.26, 896.60]), F(1, 24) = 6.43, p = .018, ηp
2
 = 
.211 (Fig. 2, right graph). 
 
These results suggest that participants remapped the 
spatial relations of the scene when responding from the 
perspective of the human avatar. The question we posed in 
Experiment 2 was whether the presence of another person is 
critical for such remapping to occur. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
To test whether remapping is driven by the presence of a 
human body, we replaced the avatar in half of the trials of 
Experiment 2 with an empty chair and asked partici-pants to 
respond from the perspective of a person who would be 
seated in the chair. If a human body is critical for producing 
the reversal of left/right and near/far map-pings, then 
remapping would be limited to the avatar session. 
Alternatively, if participants were able to men-tally locate 
themselves at the position of the empty chair, then their RTs 
would reveal remapping in both the avatar and the chair 
sessions. 
 Method 
 
Participants.  Twenty-seven healthy new volunteers (14 
women, 13 men; mean age = 24.2 years, range = 19–32) 
with no history of neurological problems took part in 
Experiment 2. All were right-handed and had nor-mal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. As in Experiment 1, participants 
were naive to the purpose of the experiment and provided 
written informed consent. 
 
Stimuli, procedure, and data analysis.  Stimuli, experimental 
procedures, and data-analysis procedures were the same as 
in Experiment 1, except that on half of the trials, the human 
avatar was replaced with an empty chair with armrests, 
which occupied approximately the same area as the avatar 
(Fig. 3a). On these trials, partici-pants were instructed to 
respond from their own per-spective (self-perspective trials) 
or from the perspective of a person who would be seated in 
the chair at the opposite side of the table (other-perspective 
trials). Ava-tar and chair trials were presented in separate 
sessions, each session containing 120 trials (60 self-
perspective and 60 other-perspective trials) divided into four 
blocks. As in Experiment 1, the order of self- and other-
perspec-tive trials was pseudorandomized to ensure that 
partici-pants were not asked to answer from the same 
perspective more than three times in a row. The order of the 
sessions (avatar, chair) was counterbalanced across 
participants. Trials in which vocal RTs deviated more than 2 
SD from the mean of each experimental condition were 
discarded as outliers (4.77%), as were trials in which 
participants responded incorrectly (4.20%). In addition, 2 
participants were excluded from the group analysis because 
their RT values deviated more than 2 SD from the group 
average. 
 
 
Results 
 
Participants were more accurate when they responded from 
their own perspective rather than the other per-spective in 
both the avatar session (self-perspective: M = .979, 95% CI 
= [.968, .989]; other-perspective: M =  
.951, 95% CI = [.929, .974]), t(24) = 2.502, p = .020, and the 
chair session (self-perspective: M = .970, 95% CI = [.957, 
.983]; other-perspective: M = .932, 95% CI = [.902,  
.962]), t(24) = 2.735, p = .012. The 2 (session: avatar, chair) 
× 2 (perspective: self, other) × 4 (position: near-right, near-
left, far-right, far-left) ANOVA on vocal RTs yielded a 
significant main effect of perspective, F(1, 24) = 37.626, p < 
.001, ηp 
2
 = .611, with slower RTs on other-perspective 
trials (M = 751.23 ms, 95% CI = [682.54, 819.93]) than on 
self-perspective trials (M = 650.85 ms, 95% CI = [603.35, 
698.36]). Additionally, the ANOVA showed a main effect of 
position, F(3, 72) = 5.763, p =  
.001, ηp
2
  = .194, and a significant interaction between 
 
perspective and position, F(3, 72) = 31.772, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 
.570.  
Preplanned contrasts showed that on self-perspective 
trials, RTs were significantly faster when the apple was 
positioned on the right side (right-near and right-far: M = 
615.07 ms, 95% CI = [574.92, 655.22]) rather than on the 
left side (left-near and left-far: M = 686.96 ms, 95% CI = 
[629.60, 744.32]), F(1, 24) = 28.40, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .542 
(Fig. 3b, left graph), and also when it was near (right-near 
and left-near: M = 616.26 ms, 95% CI = [569.96, 662.56]) 
rather than far (right-far and left-far: M = 686.23 ms, 95% 
CI = [635.70, 736.76]), F(1, 24) = 74.24, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 
.756 (Fig. 3b, right graph). In contrast, on other-perspective 
trials, RTs were significantly faster when the apple was 
positioned on the left side (left-near and left-far: M = 728.82 
ms, 95% CI = [665.52, 792.12]) rather than on the right side 
(right-near and right-far: M = 774.10 ms, 95% CI = [697.99, 
850.20]), F(1, 24) = 14.91, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .383 (Fig. 3b, left 
graph) and when it was far (right-far and left-far: M = 
734.81 ms, 95% CI = [666.31, 803.31]) rather than near 
(right-near and left-near: M = 767.19 ms, 95% CI = [697.22, 
837.16]), F(1, 24) = 12.46, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .342 (Fig. 3b, 
right graph). Contrary to the hypoth-esis that the presence of 
a human body is critical for the reversal of body mapping, 
the three-way interaction between session, perspective, and 
position was not sig-nificant, F(3, 72) = 0.447, p = .720, ηp
2
 
= .018. This indi-cates that remapping is observed both 
when participants respond from the perspective of a human 
avatar and when they respond from the perspective of an 
empty chair. Thus, remapping does not require the presence 
of a human avatar but simply the possibility of a human 
perspective. Would removing that possibility lead partici-
pants to recompute rather than remap spatial relations? We 
tested this question in Experiment 3. 
 
 
Experiment 3 
 
In the attempt to further specify the conditions for 
remapping, in this experiment, we positioned the table 
against the opposing wall and placed bookcases on either 
side of the table (Fig. 4a). Thus, in these scenes, there was 
no room for a person to occupy a position on the other side 
of the table. Remapping effects in these scenes disappeared. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants.  Twenty-six healthy new volunteers (16 
women, 10 men; mean age = 22.9 years, range = 19–27) 
with no history of neurological problems took part in the 
experiment. All were right-handed and had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. As in Experiments 1 and 2, 
participants were naive to the purpose of the experiment 
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Fig. 3.  Example stimuli and results from Experiment 2. Participants completed the same task as in Experiment 1, but on half the trials, an 
empty chair replaced the human avatar (a). The graphs (b) show mean vocal reaction time (RT) on self- and other-perspective tri-als as a 
function of left/right position of the apple (left graph) and near/far position of the apple (right graph). For both perspectives, apple positions are 
reported from the participants’ perspective. Error bars represent ±1 SE. 
 
and provided written informed consent; information about 
the experimental hypothesis was given only at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
Stimuli, procedure, and data analysis.  Stimuli, experimental 
procedures, and data-analysis procedures were the same as 
in Experiment 2, except that the chair session was replaced 
with the wall session, in which the table was positioned 
against the wall of the room between two office bookcases, 
as depicted in Figure 4a. In wall trials, participants were 
instructed to respond from their own perspective (self-
perspective trials) or from the per-spective of a person who 
would be located at the oppo-site end of the table (other-
perspective trials). As in Experiment 1, trials in which vocal 
RTs deviated more than 2 SD from the mean of the 
corresponding condition were discarded as outliers (4.44%), 
as were trials in which participants responded incorrectly 
(7.31%). In addition, 2 
 
participants were excluded from the group analysis because 
their RT values deviated more than 2 SD from the group 
average. 
 
Results 
 
Participants were more accurate when they responded from 
their own perspective rather than the other perspec-tive in 
both the avatar session (self-perspective: M = .963, 95% CI 
= [.950, .975]; other-perspective: M = .892, 95% CI = [.846, 
.939]), t(23) = 3.670, p = .001, and the wall ses-sion (self-
perspective: M = .958, 95% CI = [.941, .975]; other-
perspective: M = .895, 95% CI = [.851, .940]), t(23) = 3.043, 
p = .006. The 2 (session: avatar, wall) × 2 (perspec-tive: self, 
other) × 4 (position: near-right, near-left, far-right, far-left) 
ANOVA on vocal RTs yielded a main effect of perspective, 
F(1, 23) = 71.194, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .756, with slower RTs on 
other-perspective trials (M = 672.75 ms, 
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Fig. 4.  Example stimuli and results from Experiment 3. Participants completed the same task as in Experiment 2, except that the chair 
session was replaced with the wall session, in which the table was positioned against the wall and flanked by two bookcases  
(a). The graphs show mean vocal reaction time (RT) on self- and other-perspective trials as a function of left/right position of the apple (left 
graphs) and near/far position of the apple (right graphs), separately for the (b) avatar session and (c) wall session. For both perspectives, 
apple positions are reported from the participants’ perspective. Error bars represent ±1 SE. 
95% CI = [533.77, 610.72]) than on self-perspective trials 
(M = 572.25 ms, 95% CI = [617.03, 728.46]), and a main 
effect of position, F(3, 69) = 2.915, p = .040, ηp
2
 = .112. 
The ANOVA also revealed a significant interaction between 
perspective and position, F(3, 69) = 22.276, p <  
.001, ηp
2
 = .492, and a significant three-way interaction 
between session, perspective, and position, F(3, 69) = 3.349, 
p = .024, ηp
2
 = .127.  
Preplanned contrasts conducted on this interaction 
showed that on self-perspective trials, RTs were signifi-
cantly faster when the apple was positioned on the right side 
rather than on the left side in both the avatar session (right-
near and right-far: M = 532.03 ms, 95% CI = [498.74, 
565.32]; left-near and left-far: M = 602.03 ms, 95% CI = 
[562.57, 641.50]), F(1, 24) = 42.18, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .647, 
and the wall session (right-near and right-far: M = 554.22 
ms, 95% CI = [506.09, 602.34]; left-near and left-far: M = 
600.51 ms, 95% CI = [551.10, 649.92]), F(1, 24) = 10.71, p 
= .003, ηp
2
 = .318. Moreover, RTs were also faster when the 
apple was near rather than far in both the avatar ses-sion 
(right-near and left-near: M = 551.79 ms, 95% CI = [517.01, 
586.57]; right-far and left-far: M = 583.29 ms, 95% CI = 
[547.26, 619.32]), F(1, 24) = 23.05, p < .001, ηp
2
 =  
.500, and the wall session (right-near and left-near: M = 
564.83 ms, 95% CI = [520.08, 609.58]; right-far and left-far: 
M = 589.95 ms, 95% CI = [540.33, 639.56]), F(1, 24) = 
7.31, p = .013, ηp
2
 = .241.  
Central to our hypothesis, on other-perspective trials, a 
reversal of the effects of target position was observed only in 
the avatar session, with faster RTs when the apple was on 
the left side (left-near and left-far: M = 636.07 ms, 95% CI = 
[587.11, 685.03]) rather than on the right side (right-near and 
right-far: M = 681.18 ms, 95% CI = [629.57, 732.79]), F(1, 
24) = 12.31, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .349 (Fig. 4b, left graph), and 
when it was far (right-far and left-far: M = 645.41 ms, 95% 
CI = [597.90, 692.92]) rather than near (right-near and left-
near: M = 672.01 ms, 95% CI = [620.00, 724.01], F(1, 24) = 
6.01, p = .022, ηp
2
 = .207 (Fig. 4b, right graph). For wall 
trials, RTs were not significantly slower when the apple was 
on the left side (left-near and left-far: M = 682.55 ms, 95% 
CI = [606.43, 758.68]) rather than on the right side (right-
near and right-far: M = 691.70 ms, 95% CI = [622.82, 
760.57]), F(1, 24) = 0.34, p = .567, ηp
2
 =  
.014 (Fig. 4c, left graph). Similarly, no difference in RTs 
was observed between far positions (right-far and left-far: M 
= 683.76 ms, 95% CI = [610.75, 756.77]) and near posi-tions 
(right-near and left-near: M = 690.03 ms, 95% CI = [620.22, 
759.85]), F(1, 24) = 0.27, p = .609, ηp
2
 = .012 (Fig. 4c, right 
graph). 
 
General Discussion 
 
How do people represent space from the perspective of 
another person? In an egocentric frame of reference, 
 
people’s RTs to identify objects at specific locations vary 
with respect to their own bodies. The critical new finding 
reported here is that this pattern changes when one takes 
another person’s perspective. When responding from their 
own viewpoint, right-handed participants responded faster 
when the object was closer to and to the right of them. In 
contrast, when responding from the viewpoint of a human 
avatar seated facing them, participants responded faster 
when the object was closer to and to the right of the avatar 
(Experiment 1). A similar pattern of RTs was observed 
when an empty chair replaced the human avatar at the 
opposite side of the table (Experi-ment 2), but, notably, not 
when the table was against the wall (Experiment 3), which 
suggests that, in the latter case, participants found it difficult 
to mentally place themselves in the opposite viewpoint. 
 
These data are consistent with a dynamic change in the 
encoding of spatial relations, such that when taking another 
person’s perspective, participants remapped spa-tial 
relations to the other’s position (remapping hypoth-esis). 
Could these effects depend on the task instruction, that is, to 
judge the left/right location of a target object from one’s 
own or another’s perspective? If so, we would have 
expected a reversal of left/right mapping but not of near/far 
mapping. This is because participants were never asked to 
judge the distance of the target object. The finding that 
taking the perspective of another person also reversed the 
usual asymmetry between near and far positions supports the 
hypothesis that spatial relations were remapped 
independently of the specific task requirements. 
 
A second finding is that the mapping of spatial rela-tions 
reversed when other-perspective judgments were anchored 
both to a human avatar and to an empty chair. It may seem 
surprising that remapping also occurred in the absence of a 
body. The presence of a body anchor has been proposed to 
be necessary for embodiment of a third-person perspective 
(Gardner, Brazier, Edmonds, & Gronholm, 2013; Gianelli, 
Farnè, Salemme, Jeannerod, & Roy, 2011), and there is 
evidence that bodily features modulate spontaneous 
perspective taking (Tversky & Hard, 2009). However, these 
results may be related to understanding another person’s 
action rather than to the presence of a body (Furlanetto et 
al., 2013; Zwickel, 2009). People adopt the perspective of 
another person who acts or is in the position to act on 
objects (Tversky & Hard, 2009) and may do so even in the 
absence of a human body provided that the scene is designed 
for human action. Observers are relatively good at perceiv-
ing the potential for action for themselves and others with 
respect to object properties (Creem-Regehr, Gagnon, Geuss, 
& Stefanucci, 2013). An empty chair affords the possibility 
of sitting (Gibson, 1979). As the philosopher George 
Herbert Mead (1962) put it, “the chair invites us 
 to sit down” (p. 280). Thus, it is not surprising that in 
Experiment 2, participants relocated themselves mentally to 
the chair.  
To find the limits of remapping, in Experiment 3, we 
replicated Experiment 2 with a crucial change: We removed 
the chair and moved the table against the wall. This was 
critical to demonstrate that remapping not only appears when 
it should, but also disappears when it should. Indeed, if 
remapping depends on the possibil-ity of occupying the 
other position, then it should disap-pear when there is no 
room to locate oneself at that position. As expected, body 
remapping did not occur. How did participants report spatial 
relations in this case? If participants computed the opposing 
perspective by adjusting from their own perspective 
(recomputing hypothesis), we would have expected the usual 
advan-tage for right and near positions observed on self-
perspective trials. This did not occur. We found no dif-
ferences between left and right positions and between near 
and far positions. This pattern of RTs suggests that 
participants mapped object locations into a neutral space. 
This result is reminiscent of work by Franklin, Tversky, and 
Coon (1992) showing that participants asked to respond 
from two different perspectives alter-nately can take an 
overhead perspective of the entire scene. It is thus possible 
that because they could not relocate to the opposite 
perspective, in Experiment 3, they adopted an external 
perspective. Although the present study cannot confirm or 
disprove this hypothe-sis, the availability of such an 
alternative strategy makes the results of Experiments 1 and 2 
even more striking, as it suggests that unless access to the 
other perspective is prevented, remapping is more natural 
than adopting a neutral perspective. 
 
 
At a neural level, these findings may be related to the 
discovery that premotor and parietal cortices contain 
neuronal subpopulations that encode the space both near 
one’s own hand and near another person’s hand (Brozzoli, 
Gentile, Bergouignan, & Ehrsson, 2013; Ishida, Nakajima, 
Inase, & Murata, 2010). Intriguingly, both these areas have 
been implicated in taking the perspec-tive of another person 
(David et al., 2006; Kaiser et al., 2008). It is thus tempting to 
speculate that these sub-strates may support the dynamic 
remapping of spatial relations to an altercentric frame of 
reference during per-spective taking. 
 
It remains to be determined exactly what features of the 
scene drive remapping in the absence of a human other. 
Recent studies suggest that agency and “agentic” features are 
critical for nonhuman entities (such as arrows) to elicit 
spontaneous visual perspective process-ing (Furlanetto, 
Becchio, Samson, & Apperly, 2016; Santiesteban, Catmur, 
Hopkins, Bird, & Heyes, 2014; Schurz et al., 2015). 
Determining whether these or other 
 
features (e.g., the strength with which a scene evokes a 
view-dependent action representation) govern remap-ping in 
spatial perspective taking will guide researchers toward 
uncovering the mechanisms that allow people routinely to 
overcome their own position in space. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Overall, our results provide a notable demonstration of the 
dynamic modification of spatial representations induced by 
perspective taking. It is already well known that people can 
assume spatial perspectives different from their own. Our 
results demonstrate how people rapidly adjust their mapping 
of spatial relations to a new viewpoint, which leads to a 
remapping of object loca-tions with reference to the other 
perspective.  
Spatial remapping has been extensively documented in 
relation to tool use (Holmes & Spence, 2004; Legrand, 
Brozzoli, Rossetti, & Farnè, 2007; Serino, Bassolino, Farnè, 
& Làdavas, 2007). Our results show that, as when spatial 
recalibration is induced by tool use, spatial relations are 
recalibrated when people overcome their actual spatial 
perspective to mentally locate their body in another place 
(Pezzulo, Iodice, Ferraina, & Kessler, 2013). This suggests 
that spatial representations not only plastically change fol-
lowing active tool use, but also dynamically change when 
people take another person’s viewpoint. 
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Note 
 
1. Perspective taking, including the visual, spatial, and mental or 
conceptual varieties, has meant different things to different 
  
 
communities. Here, we refer to spatial perspective taking, that is, 
the ability to understand where something is located relative to 
someone else (Surtees, Apperly, & Samson, 2013). 
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